
September 28, 2022/CSL Research
Nigeria suffered another nationwide power outage on Monday morning after the national electricity grid collapsed for the seventh time in 2022. According to a Punch news report, industry figures seen on Monday indicated that power generation on the grid had risen to a peak of 4,100.80 megawatts on Sunday, dropped to 3,713.1MW at 6am on Monday, before crashing to about 80MW the same day.
Various power distribution companies confirmed the collapse. As earlier noted in a previous report, between 2010 and 2020, the national grid has collapsed a total of 216 times. From the incessant collapse of the national grid to electric sparks resulting in fire incidences, it goes without saying that Nigeria’s power infrastructure is giving way to neglect and underinvestment.
Speaking to the frequent collapse of the national grid, there are 24 operational power plants, but many times, nine of these account for about 80% of generation due to their size and availability. The implication is that the (over) reliance of the grid on the energy supplied by nine power plants may pose a risk to network stability in the event of a sudden loss of any of them unless adequate proactive measures such as spinning reserves are put in place.
Spinning reserves are backup energy production capacities that can be made available to the system operator (for transmission) within ten minutes of a power system failure and can operate continuously for at least two hours once brought online. It is done by increasing the power generation output of power plants already connected to the system.
Specifically, the grids are currently under the management and control of the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), which remains the only segment of the power value chain that is owned by the Federal Government since the privatisation of the sector in 2013. The management of TCN has, at various times, clamoured for reserves to cushion or perhaps forestall the occurrence of these events. TCN oversees transmission—wheeling power around the grid and installing transmission lines.
One of the main reasons the FGN privatised the sector was because NEPA/PHCN had not kept up with investing in the electricity transmission infrastructure — the critical link between generating and supplying electricity to the end-user.
Our concern here is that the NEPA/PHCN pattern of non-performance has continued till date. The complex nature of the challenges within the power sector remains a red flag for investments in the sector. Transmission is a critical aspect of the power value chain and, at this point, requires urgent attention. The inability to transmit the electricity produced by the Gencos to the Discos puts the entire system to a complete halt. Electricity cannot be stored, so, that which is not transmitted will be stranded due to lack of evacuation capacity.


