November 6, 2024/CSL Research
Yesterday, Nigeria’s national power grid experienced its ninth collapse of the year, resulting in a nationwide blackout that affected all 22 operational generation companies (GenCos) according to news reports. This latest outage underscores persistent issues in Nigeria’s power sector, which continues to grapple with instability, inadequate capacity, and frequent grid disruptions. The first major blackout of 2024 occurred on 04 February, when the grid’s output plummeted from 2,407 megawatts to just 31 MW by midday before ultimately hitting zero.
Since then, the grid has suffered repeated breakdowns, with additional collapses on August 5 and three more in October.These recurring failures highlight a growing crisis within Nigeria’s power infrastructure, as the sector remains unable to support reliable electricity for the nation.
Nigeria frequently experiences nationwide power outages due to recurring collapses of the national electricity grid. The Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), responsible for managing power transmission across the grid and installing transmission lines, remains under government control for the foreseeable future. A primary reason the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) initially privatized the power sector was the inadequate investment in transmission infrastructure by the former National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and its successor, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN).
This lack of investment severely impacted the critical link between power generation and distribution to end-users. Despite privatization efforts, little has changed, and the country’s electricity transmission infrastructure has continued to suffer from decades of underinvestment. According to a 2022 report, the national grid collapsed a total of 216 times between 2010 and 2020, underscoring the enduring challenges in Nigeria’s power sector.
From the incessant collapse of the national grid to electric sparks resulting in fire incidences, it goes without saying that Nigeria’s power infrastructure is giving way to neglect and underinvestment. There are 24 operational power plants, but many times, nine of these account for about 80% of generation due to their size and availability. The implication is that the (over) reliance of the grid on the energy supplied by nine power plants may pose a risk to network stability in the event of a sudden loss of any of them unless adequate proactive measures such as spinning reserves are put in place.
Transmission is a critical aspect of the power value chain. The GenCos and the IPPs can ramp up available capacity closer to installed capacity; the DisCos can improve their distribution networks, optimise metering, and improve collections efficiency; and gas supply and the gas transportation pipeline network can be made fit for (domestic) purpose; but, if it is not possible to transmit the electricity produced by the GenCos to the DisCos consistently and effectively, the entire system collapses figuratively and physically. Electricity cannot be stored so that which is not transmitted will be stranded due to lack of evacuation capacity.
