September 8, 2026/Cordros Report
Ghana’s sovereign credit profile has improved since the 2022 debt crisis, supported by the near completion of debt restructuring, sustained primary surpluses, stronger external balances and resumed debt service payments. Policy and restructuring uncertainty have eased, with 98.0% of the USD41.20 billion restructuring perimeter addressed by June 2026 and Ghana transitioning to a 36-month, non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) in July. We expect Ghana’s near-to-medium-term credit profile to remain supported by strong fiscal and external buffers. However, concentrated domestic maturities, pre-election spending pressures, persistent power-sector financial imbalances, the fiscal cost of the GoldBod-administered domestic gold-purchase programme and growing reliance on gold export receipts could limit Ghana’s capacity to absorb shocks.
Ghana’s Debt Restructuring Nearing Completion
Ghana’s debt restructuring programme covered approximately USD41.20 billion, comprising USD20.30 billion in domestic obligations, USD13.10 billion in Eurobonds, USD5.10 billion in official bilateral debt and USD2.70 billion in other commercial claims. By June 2026, agreed restructuring terms covered the domestic, Eurobond and bilateral components, alongside approximately USD1.70 billion in other commercial obligations. However, several individual bilateral agreements are still awaiting final execution, while negotiations with some commercial creditors remain ongoing. Ghana also completed the exchange of its SADEREA notes in July 2026, resolving the final outstanding component of its sovereign bonded debt restructuring.
The Eurobond exchange reduced principal obligations, lowered borrowing costs and extended repayment periods. The restructured 2029 and 2035 bonds carry a 5.0% coupon until July 2028, rising to 6.0% thereafter. By comparison, the 2037 bond carries a 1.5% coupon, while the 2030 instrument pays no periodic interest. These revised terms have eased near term debt service pressures, allowing Ghana to resume payments on its restructured obligations.
In July 2026, Ghana settled USD700.00 million in Eurobond obligations, comprising USD525.20 million in principal and USD174.80 million in interest. This brought cumulative Eurobond payments since January 2025 to USD2.10 billion. The government also paid GHS10.82 billion under its Domestic Debt Exchange Programme in August 2026, increasing total payments since 2025 to GHS41.36 billion.
Policy Reforms and External Tailwinds Strengthen Credit Fundamentals
Beyond the debt restructuring, Ghana has implemented a broad reform programme across its fiscal, monetary, external and public sector frameworks. These measures, largely undertaken under the IMF-supported Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme, are intended to address the institutional and policy weaknesses that contributed to the debt crisis. These measures, alongside favourable commodity prices, supported the recovery in Ghana’s key macroeconomic indicators.
Eurobond Performance Show Improved Investor Confidence
Improved credit fundamentals have supported a substantial decline in Ghana’s restructured Eurobond yields. As of September 4, 2026, Ghana’s benchmark Eurobond yield recorded 7.09%, settling lower than c. 19.0% when it defaulted in December 2022.
The improvement has been reinforced by favourable sovereign rating actions. Fitch upgraded Ghana to ‘B’ from ‘B-’ in May 2026 and assigned a Positive Outlook. Moody’s upgraded the sovereign to ‘Caa1’ from ‘Caa2’ in October 2025 and subsequently revised the outlook to Positive from Stable in April 2026. Similarly, S&P raised Ghana’s rating to ‘B-’ from ‘CCC+’ in November 2025, with a Stable Outlook.
These rating actions, alongside lower secondary market yields, point to stronger investor confidence and improved refinancing prospects. However, Ghana has yet to test its capacity to raise external commercial funding at more favourable rates through a new Eurobond issuance. The IMF’s baseline assumes a return to the international bond market in 2028. We assess that this timeline gives Ghana more time to establish a track record of policy implementation, reduce debt vulnerabilities and manage the concentrated domestic maturities in 2027–2028 before returning to external markets.
Outlook & Risk: Improved Fundamentals, but Risks Remain
Going forward, we assess that Ghana’s ability to sustain recent improvements in macroeconomic stability, debt sustainability and investor confidence will depend on continued reform implementation. For us, the government has a strong incentive to maintain fiscal discipline as rising debt service obligations and untested access to international commercial funding mean that fiscal or reform slippages could quickly raise refinancing pressures and weaken market confidence. Moreso, the government has embedded key reforms in the fiscal framework, which provides for independent oversight, regular reporting and corrective action where fiscal targets are breached. In July 2026, Ghana also transitioned from the ECF to a 36-month, non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI), which maintains IMF monitoring and supports reform continuity.
On this basis, we expect continued revenue mobilisation and tighter expenditure controls to preserve primary surpluses, while the more manageable post-restructuring repayment profile should ease financing pressures. Together, we expect these factors to support a gradual decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio, although slower progress in containing state-owned enterprise liabilities could limit the pace of debt reduction.
Additionally, we expect favourable gold prices and increased production, alongside cocoa and crude oil receipts, to keep Ghana’s export earnings sizeable. Stronger domestic activity will likely increase imports and gradually narrow the current account surplus. Nevertheless, continued external surpluses are expected to support reserve accumulation, improve foreign exchange liquidity and strengthen Ghana’s capacity to service external debt.
That said, risks remain, although we assess them as moderate in the near term. While the PCI will maintain policy oversight, it provides no new IMF financing. This means Ghana will depend more heavily on domestic revenue, access to concessional multilateral and bilateral funding, and sustained investor confidence to meet its financing needs. This reliance may become more challenging as sizeable domestic bond maturities fall due in 2027–2028. Dedicated sinking funds, renewed access to the domestic bond market and planned liability-management operations may help Ghana manage refinancing pressures. However, the concentration of maturities could still create liquidity pressures if investor demand weakens, borrowing costs rise or fiscal performance deteriorates.
Fiscal gains also remain vulnerable to renewed spending pressures ahead of the 2028 elections and persistent financial imbalances in the energy sector. Although the state-enterprise portfolio returned to aggregate profitability in 2025, continued weaknesses at key power-sector entities show that contingent fiscal risks have not fully receded. In addition, the transfer of the domestic gold-purchase programme from the Bank of Ghana to GoldBod has shifted its operating costs to the government budget. Under the arrangement formalised in July 2026, the Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for 100.0% of these costs from 1 July. While the transfer reduces the Bank of Ghana’s quasi-fiscal exposure, it could add to fiscal pressures if programme costs exceed the authorities’ 5.0% target, particularly as domestic gold purchases increase. Consequently, higher-than-expected programme costs could weaken the primary surplus, reduce fiscal buffers and constrain resources available for debt servicing.
Externally, the increasing concentration of export receipts in gold leaves the current account and reserve accumulation exposed to a sharp correction in commodity prices or weaker production. Such a shock is expected to narrow the external surplus, weaken foreign exchange inflows and place renewed pressure on the cedi, reducing external liquidity and increasing the domestic currency burden of meeting foreign currency debt obligations.
In addition, delays in completing the remaining debt restructuring or slippages in reform implementation under the PCI could weaken investor confidence and slow the rebuilding of fiscal and external buffers.